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Abstract
Researchers have recently proposed that “moralistic” religions—those with moral doctrines,
moralistic supernatural punishment, and lower emphasis on ritual—emerged as an effect of
greater wealth and material security. One interpretation appeals to life history theory, pre-
dicting that individuals with “slow life history” strategies will be more attracted to moralistic
traditions as a means to judge those with “fast life history” strategies. As we had reserva-
tions about the validity of this application of life history theory, we tested these predictions
with a data set consisting of 592 individuals from eight diverse societies. Our sample
includes individuals from a wide range of traditions, including world religions such as Bud-
dhism, Hinduism and Christianity, but also local traditions rooted in beliefs in animism,
ancestor worship, and worship of spirits associated with nature. We first test for the pres-
ence of associations between material security, years of formal education, and reproductive
success. Consistent with popular life history predictions, we find evidence that material
security and education are associated with reduced reproduction. Building on this, we then
test whether or not these demographic factors predict the moral concern, punitiveness,
attributed knowledge-breadth, and frequency of ritual devotions towards two deities in each
society. Here, we find no reliable evidence of a relationship between number of children,
material security, or formal education and the individual-level religious beliefs and behav-
iors. We conclude with a discussion of why life-history theory is an inadequate interpretation
for the emergence of factors typifying the moralistic traditions.
Introduction
Over the past few decades, numerous scholars have sought to explain the emergence and
spread of “moralistic” religious traditions. These traditions are characterized as those that
emphasize adherence to prosocial norms under the threat of punishment by knowledgeable
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deities explicitly concerned with how we treat each other. Many have assessed how socioecolo-
gical variables such as societal complexity [1, 2], resource scarcity [3], and animal husbandry
[4], can help explain the emergence of these “moralistic high gods.”
There is some evidence that commitment to moralistic gods—deities thought to be con-
cerned with moral norms, particularly those claimed to bestow costs or benefits to people
based on their moral actions—post-date critical thresholds of societal complexity, suggesting
they developed and spread as a response to that complexity [2]. Normative beliefs in divine
punishment and supernatural monitoring by these deities may function adaptively by reducing
the costs of punishing others for misconduct [1], while further expanding and/or stabilizing
the sphere of human cooperation [5, 6]. Moreover, an emerging secularization literature
shows that among contemporary state societies, greater material security [7], economic equal-
ity [8], and education [9] predict less overall religiosity cross-nationally. In other words, the
functions that moralistic religions traditionally served may have been co-opted and out-com-
peted by effective secular institutions, thus diminishing the significance of the former.
As detailed below, some researchers [10, 11] have challenged this view by arguing that a
widespread shift in affluence was the prime mover of the genesis and ubiquity of the moralistic
and ascetic traditions. According to this alternative theory, religious traditions turn moralistic
not because widely shared beliefs in supernatural deities contribute to stabilizing wider proso-
ciality or carry adaptive externalities, but rather because life history strategies covary with envi-
ronmental fluctuations [11] and this predicts a concomitant shift in religious expression.
Before discussing this hypothesis in more detail, we first briefly review life history theory.
Generally, mathematical models in life history theory are grounded on the idea that natural
selection favors developmental and reproductive strategies that increase fitness, and that opti-
mal life history strategies may co-vary with mortality regimes [12, 13] and ecological condi-
tions, such as average resource abundance and the associated variance in realizable resources
[14, 15]. With respect to empirical studies of human reproduction, life history theory is ren-
dered more complicated by human flexibility and the demographic transition [16–21]. One
commonly cited subset of the theory is framed in terms of reproductive speed (i.e., a “slow” vs.
“fast” life history) where reproductive rate is predicted to co-vary with resource security.
There is some evidence regarding a positive relationship between material security and the
number of children people have in traditional societies [22]. In post-demographic transition
contexts, however, some evidence suggests that more educated parents will invest more time
and resources in children [19]. However, increased education and material security are fre-
quently associated with lower fertility rates [23, 24]. Foregoing reproduction in such contexts
can both increase the socioeconomic status of subsequent generations, as well as reduce the
number of children people have [25]. Further complications abound regarding how this
“slow-fast” spectrum follows from evolutionary life history theory (see Discussion).
Aiming to extend these ideas to the domain of human cultural variation, Baumard et al.
[10, 11, 26] recently argued that the rise of moralistic religious traditions (i.e., those with doc-
trines including something akin to the “Golden Rule”) and the decline of ritual devotion are
indicative of slow life history strategies. Contrary to recent findings of the relationship between
morally concerned deities and ecological duress [3] or social complexity [2], this work argues
that moralizing religious beliefs are “a set of beliefs that are pragmatically held by slow-life
individuals to help them moralize fast-life behaviours” [10]. In other words, wealthier people
with fewer, “higher-quality” children are more prone to morally judge poorer people with rela-
tively more children. This research predicts that at the individual level, “moralizing beliefs are
more strongly held by people pursuing a slow strategy” [10, p. 4].
In an empirical study, Baumard et al. [11] found that greater projected energy capture (per
capita/diem kcal, estimated from historical data) predicted the emergence of moralistic
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religions of the so-called “Axial Age,” a period (roughly between 800 and 200 BCE) often
touted as a radical shift in human thought, religion, and social complexity [27, 28]. Though the
details regarding how this might have happened remain unclear, the authors suggest that their
results could be interpreted with life history theory (as expressed by the slow-fast continuum)
insofar as “a massive increase in prosperity and certainty during the Axial Age may have trig-
gered a drastic change in strategies, shifting motivations away from materialistic goals . . .
toward long-term investment in reciprocation.” This “shift in priorities progressively would
have impacted religious . . . traditions through a transmission bias, in favor of doctrines and
institutions that coincided with the new values” [11, pp. 12-13]. Affluence moves “individuals
away from ‘fast life’ strategies (resource acquisition and coercive interactions) and toward
‘slow life’ strategies (self-control techniques and cooperative interactions) typically found in
axial movements” (p. 11). These “doctrines and institutions” associated with “slow-life strate-
gies” include: increased asceticism, level of moral concern, punitiveness, and the breadth of
knowledge (i.e., omniscience indicative of universalizing governance) attributed to deities, as
well as the purported shift in emphasis from the ritual performances held by more traditional
societies to one of “ethical commands” [10, 11].
There are a few limitations to and problems with these assertions and empirical tests. First,
many of the features of religions often claimed to have developed during the “Axial Age” pre-
date this period [6]. Second, as we detail in the Discussion section, evolutionary life history
theory does not, in fact, predict a generalized “slow-fast” tradeoff [14, 15]. Rather, formal mod-
els of life history evolution demonstrate that the relationship between environmental harsh-
ness and life history variables is contingent on critical exogenous demographic and cultural
factors.
Third, while the theory [10] details individual-level phenomena—the appropriate level of
measurement for tests of life history processes—the test [11] uses coarse group-level wealth
measures with no consideration of within-tradition variation. To their credit, Baumard et al.
acknowledge that their measure “does not take into account the distribution of resources
within a given society. . .[e.g., being] upper middle class in Greece. . .was probably much
greater than what was available to the corresponding class in Persia or Egypt” (12). Here, they
acknowledge that group-level per capita/diem kcal is an unreliable index of individual-level
wealth distributions within groups. More specifically, group-level point estimates (e.g., mean
kcals) are not indicative of within-group variation necessary to adequately test the life history
predictions linking wealth and belief in more moralizing deities within populations. In fact,
this may give misleading results (see below and Section 6 in S1 Supporting Information). Vari-
ation in beliefs and practices faces the same problem; models of life history theory cannot eas-
ily speak to group-level abstractions like “Christianity,” “Buddhism,” or “Axial.” In summary,
tests of the life history interpretations of group-level patterns require higher-resolution data.
The present research report attempts to do just this.
If popular life history predictions hold, then material security and education should corre-
spond to fewer children. Assuming these conditions hold, if the aforementioned core features
of moralistic religious traditions emerged due to shifting levels of wealth and generalized well-
being, then—within the context of one’s community—an individual’s material security should
be positively associated with his or her beliefs about the: 1) the level of moral concern of their
deities, 2) the extent of divine sanctioning of moral norm-violators, and 3) the level of knowl-
edge or omniscience (supernatural monitoring) of their deities. Moreover, material security
should be 4) negatively associated with ritual participation. If these qualities attributed to dei-
ties emerge as a function of material security, we should also see a spike in the attribution of
these qualities to locally salient—but relatively less moralistic, punitive, and knowledgeable—
deities when resource security is higher. Here, we test these hypotheses using individual-level
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data collected in eight diverse field sites, using a modeling framework that accounts for varia-
tion within and across cultural groups.
Method
Participants
We recruited participants (N = 592; 311 females; mean age = 37.40, SD of age = 14.97; mean
number of children (given birth to or fathered) = 2.45, SD of number of children = 2.43) from
eight different field sites: (1) Coastal and (2) Inland Tanna, Vanuatu; (3) Lovu and (4) Yasawa,
Fiji; (5) Porte aux Piment, Mauritius; (6) Kyzyl, Tyva Republic; (7) Hadzaland, Tanzania; and
(8) Marajo´, Brazil. Table 1 highlights some demographic and religious features of our sample
and further descriptive statistics for each site are in Tables A-B in S1 Supporting Information.
Across sites, participants gave at minimum, their verbal consent to participate after hearing a
statement about informed consent approved by all researchers’ home institutions at the time
of project execution.
Our participants vary in their adherence to world religious traditions including Christian-
ity, Hinduism, and Buddhism, and also engage in a wide range of traditional religious practices
including shamanism, animism, and ancestor worship. This sample is well-suited to test the
target predictions insofar as it consists of individual-level data that allows us to assess relative
material security within-and across sites that vary in their adherence to various traditions, and
have locally specific distributions of all target variables.
Materials and methods
The present data are from the publicly available Evolution of Religion and Morality Project
dataset Version 3.0 [29]. We developed this cross-cultural dataset to test predictions about reli-
gious beliefs, behaviors, and cooperation. For the present study, our target variable types are:
demographic measures, material security, and religious commitment. Further details of our
measures can be found in Section 3 of the S1 Supporting Information, along with all data and
scripts required to implement a complete reproduction of the analyses. All materials for a full
reproduction of our analyses are available at https://github.com/bgpurzycki/Material-Security-
and-Moralistic-Religions.
Table 1. Descriptive statistics of each field site.
Site/Sample World Religion Economy N Children Years Educ. Food Sec.
Coastal Tanna Christianity Horticulture/Market 44 2.52 (1.86) 8.18 (3.55) 0.82 (0.39)
Hadza None Foraging 68 4.28 (2.61) 1.38 (2.68) 0.15 (0.36)
Inland Tanna None Horticulture 76 3.67 (3.53) 0.63 (2.08) 0.72 (0.45)
Lovu, Fiji Hinduism Market 76 2.24 (1.59) 8.77 (3.78) 0.14 (0.35)
Mauritians Hinduism Market 95 1.40 (1.58) 8.14 (2.98) 0.65 (0.48)
Marajo´ Brazilians Christianity Market 77 2.18 (2.56) 8.00 (3.53) 0.10 (0.31)
Tyva Republic Buddhism Herding/Market 81 1.70 (1.43) 15.44 (2.29) 0.72 (0.45)
Yasawa, Fiji Christianity Horticulture/Market 75 2.00 (2.07) 9.66 (2.42) 0.41 (0.50)
Grand M (SD) — — 74.00 (14.36) 2.45 (2.43) 7.63 (5.37) 0.46 (0.50)
Values are means and (standard deviations) for number of children, years of formal education, and food security. See Tables A-B in S1 Supporting Information for
additional summary statistics.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0193856.t001
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Demographics. We include sex and age as covariates in all regression models. In our
models predicting number of children, we hold its obvious relationship with age constant. In
order to account for the nonlinear relationship between age and number of children, and to
minimize problems associated with multicollinearity, we include age as an exposure variable
(i.e., removing pre- and post-reproductive windows), with the coefficient representing the
elasticity of reproduction with respect to age (Section 3.1 in S1 Supporting Information).
We also asked for the total years of formal education completed by each respondent, and
include this variable in some analyses to hold its potential relationship with achieved fertility
outcomes [23, 24] and religious beliefs [30] constant. Finally, in order to hold constant the pos-
sible effects of increased family size on the outcomes of interest, we include number of children
in some models of religious beliefs.
Material security. We measured material security using eight time-varying indices (Sec-
tion 3.1 in S1 Supporting Information). In part due to our focus on current material security
rather than perceived future prospects and partly due to the Hadza’s unfamiliarity with scales
and similar time increments, we focus here on self-reported food security for the coming
month: Do you worry that in the next month your household will have a time when it is not able
to buy or produce enough food to eat? This measure was strongly correlated cross-culturally
with other self-report measures of material security [31]. Participants responded in a dichoto-
mous fashion (yes = 1; no = 0) and we subsequently reverse-coded these data for the sake of
clarity. For the sake of comparison, we include additional analyses (without the Hadza) that
use comparable continuous-scale measurements of participants’ confidence in their access to
food in the coming month reported in Table C in S1 Supporting Information.
Religious commitment. We operationalize the construct of practicing a more “moralis-
tic” religion by measuring the degree to which individuals claim their deities care about pun-
ishing theft, deceit, and murder, how knowledgeable deities are thought to be, and how often
people perform devotional rituals to these deities. This operationalization directly taps key ele-
ments in Baumard et al.’s proposals, and avoids using the crude typological classifications such
as “Christian” or “Muslim” that most researchers acknowledge as underspecified.
Our religion measures derive from extensive ethnographic interviews about religious beliefs
and practices (Section 3.3 in S1 Supporting Information). Drawing on these interviews, we
selected two locally salient deities that were differentially attributed with moral concern. One
god we asked about was the most locally salient moralistic deity. The other was a relatively less
moralistic, but locally important supernatural agent [5]. To measure explicit beliefs, we crafted
questions about each variable of interest as it applies to each of these two kinds of spiritual
agents. From these responses, we created measures that assessed how individuals conceptualize
the: 1) concerns about moral behavior, 2) propensity toward punishment, and 3) scope of
knowledge (i.e., breadth of supernatural monitoring) expressed by their deities. Finally, we
assessed 4) the frequency in which participants engage in ritual devotions to these deities.
Analyses. All analyses are implemented using multi-level Bayesian regression models,
with outcome distributions that are appropriately tailored to the empirical data; reproductive
outcomes are fit using negative binomial regressions, ordered categorical outcomes are fit
using ordered logistic regressions, and interval constrained outcomes are fit using beta regres-
sions (Section 4 in the S1 Supporting Information). For the main regression models, we focus
on within-group variation by placing weak priors on the parameters controlling inter-site vari-
ation in intercepts and slopes (partial pooling). In Tables H-L in the S1 Supporting Informa-
tion, we also report results for fully pooled models where inter-site variation was fixed at zero,
strictly for the sake of illustration. All reported results include 90% equal tail posterior credibil-
ity intervals. For our predictions about religion, we assessed each deity in separate blocks; in
the event that beliefs about moralistic deities influence or bleed into beliefs about local deities,
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we held corresponding moralistic deity variables constant in our local deity models. Model
descriptions, results tables, diagnostics, additional analyses and links to analytical scripts are
included in the S1 Supporting Information.
Results
Do materially secure individuals have fewer children?
Table 2 presents three model specifications crafted for the purposes of assessing the robustness
of the target variables. Model 1 represents the full model, illustrated in Fig 1. Holding age and
sex constant, greater levels of material security are associated with fewer children across mod-
els. Additionally, years of formal education predict fewer children, a result consistent with pre-
vious work using data from European sources [23, 24]. Model 2 predicts that, on average
across populations, being materially secure leads to a difference of -0.73 (-1.74, 0.08) children
born for a woman who is past child-bearing years. Model 3 shows that an additional decade of
schooling yields an average change of -1.58 (-3.29, -0.24) children born for a post-reproductive
woman.
The qualitative results are robust to analysis using a fully pooled model. The supplementary
code generates site-specific plots of the posterior estimates of regression coefficients. There, we
demonstrate that the cross-population average estimates are similar to the results of each pop-
ulation (i.e., inter-site variation is small, and random effects are consistently on one side of
zero).
Do materially secure individuals conceptualize deities as more moralistic?
Recall that we selected two deities as targets for our questions precisely for the variation they
exhibited in explicit association with moral concern. We modeled participants’ beliefs about
moralistic and locally salient supernatural beings’ moral concern using the same set of
Table 2. Cross-population mean estimates of achieved fertility with 90% credibility intervals.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Food Security -0.14 -0.13 —
(-0.30, 0.01) (-0.27, 0.01)
Education -0.03 — -0.03
(-0.05, -0.01) (-0.05, 0.00)
Age (Elasticity) 1.02 1.07 1.01
(0.86, 1.20) (0.90, 1.24) (0.83, 1.18)
Male -0.17 -0.19 -0.18
(-0.30, -0.05) (-0.31, -0.08) (-0.30, -0.06)
Intercept -1.94 -2.31 -2.01
(-2.55, -1.31) (-2.88, -1.73) (-2.64, -1.36)
Model 1 is the full model, and Models 2 and 3 drop education and food security outcomes, respectively. Across
populations, we see proportionality between exposure time to risk of reproduction and number of children, as
indicated by the elasticity estimate on age being centered on the value of 1. Males show reduced age-specific
production of offspring relative to females. We note reliably negative average effects of education and wealth security
on achieved fertility.
Denotes credibility intervals that do not cross zero.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0193856.t002
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covariates. If more materially secure respondents think of the relatively less moralistic local
deities to be more moralistic than their materially insecure counterparts, this would provide an
even better test of the driving hypothesis. In other words, we should be able to detect the emer-
gence of moralistic gods when material security is higher, both within and across sites.
Fig 2 assesses our data at a similar level of abstraction employed by [11]. It plots the group-
level grand means of material security and the moral index for local deities. The regression line
is a simple linear regression line where the intercept is 1.10 (90% cred. int. = -0.54, 2.74) and
the slope is estimated at 1.32 (90% cred. int. = -1.31, 3.96). Though a poorly-specified model
detailing an implausible relationship, it is in the predicted direction of Baumard et al.’s hypoth-
eses; a groups’ average material security appears to be associated with the degree to which that
group on average claims local deities care about morality. As within-site variation may, for
example, be negative, such a result may be misleading.
In our models that fully account for within- and cross-site variation, the target demographic
predictors failed to account for the moralization of gods’ concerns (Fig 3). In all of our models,
only moralistic deities’ moral concern predited local deities’ attributed moral concerns. These
findings reveal no relationship between material security and belief in more moralistic local
deities within any given community, but there may be site-level covariance in the frequency of
material security and the likelihood of respondents claiming that local deities care about moral
behavior (see code). While the evolutionary dynamics proposed by Baumard et al. [10, 11, 26]
are best evaluated at the level of individuals clustered by site (as we do here), a deeper analysis
of the evolutionary dynamics underlying the weak group level covariance uncovered here with
a larger sample of populations may be warranted.
Fig 1. 90% credibility intervals of mean estimates for factors predicting achieved fertility (Model 1 in Table 2). Effects to the right of zero
are positive and effects to the left of zero are negative.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0193856.g001
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Fig 3 illustrates the mean estimates for the target religious commitment variables for all full
models. It shows that there is no evidence of a relationship between our demographic “life his-
tory” variables and our religion measures for either deity. To test whether or not material secu-
rity accounts for the degree to which participants attribute moral concern to their deities, we
regressed the moral indices on the aforementioned demographic variables. Contrary to the
hypothesis that material security should predict greater moral concern attributed to deities, we
found no such relationship; within sites, individuals living in more fortunate circumstances do
not claim their deities care more about morality.
Fig 2. Group-level moralization of local deities appears to increase as a function of group-level material security. Note that
the Hadza are missing due to difficulty with scale items and the Lovu are missing due to a lack of local deity data. This figure
illustrates how aggregate, group-level patterns can be misleading for individual-level inferences. Compare this to the null effects
in the Local Deity block in Fig 2 and Table D in S1 Supporting Information.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0193856.g002
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Do materially secure individuals claim their deities know more?
We also assessed whether or not material security accounts for participants’ views of supernat-
ural beings’ knowledge and monitoring. Again, we found no such relationship (green in Fig 2).
Food security, sex, number of children, and years of formal education are not associated with
how much people claim their deities know or monitor. How much participants claim the mor-
alistic deities know, however, reliably predicted how much they claimed local deities know.
Fig 3. Mean estimates and 90% credibility intervals for the levels of moral concern, knowledge breadth, punishment, and self-reported devotional
ritual frequency attributed to moralistic (a) and local (b) deities as a function of food security, years of formal education and number of children. These
results hold participant sex and age constant. All values are from the results tables taken from the full models in Tables D-G in S1 Supporting Information.
The end points of histograms are mean estimates. We include them for easier visual comparison of relative direction and distance from zero. Narrower error
bars indicate more precise estimates. Effects to the right of zero are positive and effects to the left of zero are negative. Error bar symmetry around zero
indicates no reliable effect; we found no evidence supporting any of the target predictions about religion.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0193856.g003
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Do materially secure individuals claim deities punish more?
Here, too, we found no relationship between food security and the claimed moralistic punish-
ment of local and moralistic gods (blue in Fig 2). Food security, sex, number of children, and
years of formal education are not associated with how much people claim their moralistic dei-
ties punish, but again, moralistic deities’ punishment scores had a strong association with local
deities’ punishment scores.
Do materially secure individuals participate in rituals less often?
To test whether or not material security predicts ritual practice frequency, we regressed self-
reported devotional ritual frequency on the target demographic variables. We found no evi-
dence suggesting that food security predicts less ritual performance (red in Fig 2). Note, how-
ever, that while the effect (0.26) is not reliable (90% cred. int. = -0.19, 0.78), ritual frequency
toward moralistic gods is in the reverse of the predicted direction. For local deities, the only
reliable relationship found is the positive one between how often participants engage in rituals
for moralistic gods.
Discussion
Life history, material security, and reproductive outcomes
Recent work [10, 11, 26] has argued that models in life history theory, coupled with evidence
of fluctuating state-transitions in environmentally-linked variables such as energy capture,
affluence, or material security can explain the rise of moralistic religions. However, earlier [14]
and more recent [15] advances in life history theory suggest the very opposite. Rather than
absolute affluence having predictable effects on human motivation and reward systems or
shifts from “slow” to “fast” life history strategies, these advances show that: 1) evolutionary the-
ory does not, in general, predict that harsh environments (i.e., those with severe resource stress
and high mortality rates) should favor fast life histories, or that affluent environments will
favor slow life histories, and 2) that most life history models used to explain phenotypically
plastic (i.e., cultural and behavioral) responses to fluctuating environmental states have been
misapplied and/or draw misleading conclusions.
Although the prediction that harsh environments select for faster life histories is a popularly
cited one among some anthropologists and evolutionary psychologists [32, 33], such hypothe-
ses are typically presented with little formal, mathematical support [14, 15]. In some cases, evo-
lutionary theory does predict that harsh environments should favor fast life histories, but this
result does not hold in general, and the mechanistic details of the system—such as age-struc-
ture, parental investment, and how population dynamics are regulated—mediate which type
of strategy will be favored in each type of environment [15].
Furthermore, the formal evolutionary models underpinning life history theory [15] typi-
cally assume that an entire population is genetically evolving toward a uniformly changing
environment. Intuitively, we might assume that the optimal plastic response to a heteroge-
neous environment would be to employ the fixed behavior of a population that uniformly
inhabits such conditions. However, as Baldini [15] demonstrates, this intuition is inconsistent
with what the theory actually predicts; we require formal models of plastic life history strategies
to make useful empirical predictions concerning how populations will flexibly adapt to specific
kinds of fluctuating environments. The outcomes of adaptive strategies in fluctuating environ-
ments can be counterintuitive (e.g., food storage leading to more extreme famines; [34]), and
strongly depend on the details of the population and environmental system [35].
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This being said, we did find the same empirical trend using individual-level data that Bau-
mard et al. [11] assume to exist. That is, increased material security is associated with
decreased age-specific fertility. This also places our findings in line with a large but variable
empirical literature finding such relationships in humans. However, it is not clear from our
cross-sectional analysis if individuals with low food security have faster life histories and more
children as an adaptive, risk-sensitive response to ecological circumstances, as some models
might predict [36–38], or if more mundane reasons exist. For example, people with more chil-
dren might be less certain about future food availability simply because they have more
mouths to feed in their household [39]. Our results are consistent with either or both of these
interpretations.
We also find a relationship between education and reproduction. It could be that the more
time parents invest in their own education, the more likely they are to delay reproduction for
non-adaptive reasons. Alternatively, there may be adaptive reasons for investment in the edu-
cation and embodied capital of oneself and of one’s children [18, 23, 24, 40]. As is also the case
with our findings concerning material security, the direction of causality here is ambiguous.
Despite this causal ambiguity concerning the correlates of material security, our cross-sec-
tional analyses do demonstrate that our measures of food security and education can predict
life history related outcomes cross-culturally; so our failure to find a relationship between
material security and our measures of religious commitments is not easily dismissed on the
basis of an ineffective operationalization of the material security measure.
Moral religions and material security
Food security failed to account for the degree to which people claim their deities: 1) care about
morality, 2) punish people, and 3) engage in supernatural monitoring. It also failed to account
for: 4) respondents’ levels of ritual devotion to their deities. We found no support for any of
the target predictions [10, 11], in either class of deities (moralistic or local), regardless of the
other variables we included in models.
Of course, some key differences between our methods and those that others have employed
may have contributed to these null results. While [11] used highly aggregated measures of pro-
jected energy capture for eight large geographic regions as a proxy variable for human afflu-
ence, we used individual-level, subjective measures of food security as an indicator of
affluence. Additionally, Baumard et al. sampled traditions predetermined to be “moralistic” or
“Axial” by academic consensus (which focuses only on elites), whereas we determined the
degree to which individuals engaged in beliefs and behaviors typifying such traditions by elicit-
ing and quantifying the characteristics they attributed to their deities.
While our data have the benefit of being grounded in individual sensibilities rather than
coarse, group-level characterizations derived from historical sources involving substantial pro-
jections, they do reflect an ethnographic present that already includes the presence of these
“moralistic” traditions, and do not assess their de novo emergence. Note again, however, that
we saw no obvious association between food security and increased attributed moral concern
to local deities. In other words, deities with relatively less moral concern do not appear to be
evolving into moralistic deities due to any factor associated with material security. While our
results have implications for the past, we do not assess data derived or postulated from the his-
torical record.
Baumard et al. favor life-history theory as an explanation for the patterns they find [10, 11,
41]. Our analysis suggests that while the popular life history assumptions hold, they do not
help to explain the target features of religion. While our results suggest that life history theory
is not as useful as they might hope, longitudinal and detailed demographic, economic, and
Material security, life history, and moralistic religions
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ethnographic data from multiple populations are crucial in order to reliably determine
whether or not life history theory is helpful in explaining the emergence of the so-called “mor-
alistic” traditions.
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